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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON OLD LAW
Thomas Salisbury*
"[Plerhaps erroneous identification of the accused constitutes
the major cause of the known wrongful convictions."'
I. INTRODUCTION
"That's the man-seated over there at the table. I could never for-
get his face." Similar statements are heard in almost every trial in
which an eyewitness is called by the prosecution to identify the ac-
cused.2 There can be little doubt that this type of testimony has a dev-
astating effect upon the jury's assessment of the defendant's guilt or
innocence? Historically such testimony has been the principal cause of
erroneous or wrongful convictions.' Glanville Williams, in comment-
* Attorney, sole practitioner in Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.A. Northwestern Missouri State Uni-
versity; J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. B. FRANK & J. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1957).
2. N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 6-7 (1972 & Supp. 1980); Buckhout, Eyewitness
Testimony 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171 (1975).
3. P. WALL, EYE-WITNEss IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19-23 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as WALL].
4. One commentator, in looking at historical examples of misidentification, took special
note of several obvious cases and stated:
The defects in the identification evidence in these cases may be briefly catalogued.
Amongst the identifications accepted as reliable were (I) a hesitating identification by
one witness after the defendant had been on parade before 15 witnesses without being
picked out by one of them; (2) identification by a witness who picked out the wrong man
on one parade and walked past the defendant twice on the second parade before picking
him out; (3) identification by one man three months after the incident; (4) identification
by a girl who had seen the offender only by the light of the moon; (5) in a case where the
offender had grey hair, identification of the defendant, a man with nearly white hair, in a
parade where all the other 1 I men had dark hair. In one case, where a member of the
Metropolitan police attempted to intercede for a neighbour of unblemished character
who was charged by the City of London police on implausible identification evidence,
the result was that he himself was put on parade, "identified," and immediately sus-
pnded from duty as being under suspicion of being concerned in the same offence!As ihese incidents were not enough, the author catalogues numerous other cases of misidentifi-
cation. See Williams, Evidence of ldentbfcatiom The Devin Report, 76 CRIM. L. REV. 407, 408
(1976).
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ing on the Devlin Report on English identification procedures, has
noted:
Neither the Beck case at the turn of the century nor the
many miscarriages of justice since then have sufficiently im-
pressed those concerned with criminal justice of the dangers
of identification evidence. To mention some of the instances
in late years: three occurred in Bradford alone in the space of
a few months in 1967-68. A memorandum of the National
Council of Civil Liberties. . . in 1968 gave details of 15 cases
from 1966 onwards; in most of these a person was convicted
on identification evidence, and a mistake was either estab-
lished or very likely; in a few of them the defendant had not
gone beyond being committed for trial when by a happy acci-
dent the mistake was discovered. A memorandum later in the
same year from 'Justice' (the British section of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists) instanced another six cases; and
others have occurred since. In all of them the mistake came
to light in some fortuitous way-as by the real offender com-
ing forward and confessing.
To be sure, the English experience is not unique. Similar instances can
be found in recent years in the United States;6 however, a comprehen-
5. Williams, supra note 4, at 407 (footnotes omitted).
6. The English experience should not be disregarded in the United States as something that
could not happen here due to our advanced criminal justice system. One noted psychologist in the
area has stated:
Frank Wiechman, was arrested and after being identified by four separate witnesses, he
was charged with the kidnapping. Wiechman spent almost a week in jail, with the
charge of kidnapping hanging over his head, maintaining his innocence the entire time.
It turns out that Wiechman was completely innocent, but he was released only after
the Cincinnati police subsequently found evidence that the actual kidnapper was Clif-
ford J. Kroger. Wiechman's only "crime" was that he looked like Kroger, and for this he
spent nearly a week in jail.
This is far from a rare, isolated case of mistaken identification; we know there are
others, but, unfortunately for those who may still be languishing in jail, we do not know
how many.
-In November, 1972, a 17-year old college freshman, Lawrence Berson was arrested
and held on $60,000 bail on multiple rape charges in Queens, New York. He was re-
leased only after the arrest of a 20-year old Bronx "gypsy cab" driver who looks strik-
ingly like Berson. Five women victims had mistakenly identified Berson as their attacker.
-In June, 1972, 43-year old Frank J. Doto was arrested in connection with a super-
market robbery in California in which a policeman was shot in the head. Seventeen
witnesses identified Doto, who maintained he was in another city at the time of the
holdup. His story checked out.
-In early 1973, Assistant District Attorney William Schrager was arrested in connec-
tion with a series of sexual assaults. He was put into a number of lineups, usually with
policemen who were taller and heavier than he. To his horror, he was identified by four
different women. Schrager was later released when a similar looking postman (who is
the same height but 40 pounds heavier than Schrager) confessed to some of the crimes.
In October, 1971, a 34-year old Chicano, Ruben Garcia, was arrested and charged
2
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sive study in the tradition of the English Devlin Report has not yet
been carried out in this country.
Erroneous identifications can occur from procedures free from
prejudice as well as from tainted or suggestive procedures. Therefore,
defense attorneys, in cases where eyewitness testimony is introduced,
carry two alternative burdens: (1) to insure against suggestive or
tainted pre-trial identification procedures; and (2) in those cases where
the procedures are not tainted, to attack the in-court identification testi-
mony before the jury. Defense counsel must use every tool available,
within the bounds of law and ethics, to prevent the criminal justice
system from erring in meting out punishment. Owing to the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area,1 this task has been made most difficult.
This article will analyze the law relating to eyewitness identification
and attempt to provide defense counsel with methods to attack both the
tainted and untainted identification procedures.
II. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
In order fully to comprehend the field of eyewitness identification,
one should first be aware of its place in the criminal law with respect to
the types of crimes with which it is generally associated. According to
one commentator:
[R]ecourse to lineups, showups and photo identifications are
prevalent mainly in robberies. An examination of over two
hundred reported identification decisions establishes that the
number of robberies exceeds all other crimes combined.
There are a few decisions dealing with forcible rapes, burgla-
with the armed robbery of a restaurant-bar in California. Three people identified Gar-
cia, one of whom was a police detective who happened to be eating at the restaurant on
the night of the robbery. Garcia spent at least three months in the county jail, and prob-
ably would have been there longer had another man not confessed to the crime.
Gregory Boyd was ordered to stand trial after two gas station attendants identified
him as the man who held them up. Boyd, who simply could not remember where he was
on the night of the robbery, spent nearly a month in a Detroit county jail until his trial
began. While on the stand, Boyd remembered, and he announced that he had been in
jail on the date of the hold up. Probably no better alibi exists; the case was promptly
dismissed.
These examples show that one witness, two witnesses, three, five or even 17 wit-
nesses. . all can be wrong. A night in jail, a week, a month or three months. . . all
are pretty horrible, particularly when forced on an innocent man.
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Does the Malleable Human Memory Inte/ere With Legal Jusice, 2
SOCIAL ACTION & THE LAW 5 (Apr. 1975).
7. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 40 (1969); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
[Vol. 15:38
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ries, and an occasional homicide. But it is primarily in the
crime of robbery that the identification issue recurs. There is
generally, in such a crime, very little opportunity for observa-
tion, and consequently conviction often turns solely on the ca-
pacity of the eye-witness for memory and perception. It is in
these crimes that the vagaries of eye-witness identification cre-
ate the only real danger of convicting the innocent.'
Thus, defense counsel is most often faced with an identification
problem in a crime wherein the time for perception was short; the wit-
ness, more often than not, was watching a menacing weapon instead of
the perpetrator's face; and the crime occurred where the lighting was
poor if not nonexistent. The factor of poor lighting is common. Fifty
percent of all robberies are street muggings.9 Counsel should be inti-
mately aware of these general causes of erroneous identifications, for
such an understanding may enable him to make the present state of the
law work to his client's advantage.' 0
In working with the typical eyewitness identification case, defense
counsel will be faced with one of three forms of identification proce-
dure. First, the police may arrest a suspect and transport him to the jail
where a lineup may be held, forcing the witnesses to choose the suspect
8. SOBEL, supra note 2, § 2 at 5.
9. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1972 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 17 (1972).
10. At least one commentator has recognized the following causes for erroneous identifica-
tions:
A. Normal and universal fallibilities of human sense perception.
1. Great many people with normal vision cannot recognize similarities and differ-
ences, nor distinguish variations in form, size and position.
2. Normal mental faculties may receive erroneous data because of similarities be-
tween persons. [Perceptual non-individuality].
3. Tests have proved that people are unable to describe accurately what they saw.
4. Ability to remember what was seen varies.
B. Susceptibility of human mind to suggestive inferences.
1. Improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for most
mistakes in identification and more miscarriages of justice than any other single
factor. [Citation omitted].
a. Suspect pointed out by police beforehand.
b. Only suspect required to act or speak like perpetrator of crime.
c. Only suspect in handcuffs during showup.
d. Only suspect required to dress similar to perpetrator.
e. Witness told that police have culprit.
f. Witness permitted to see suspect before lineup.
Witnesses make identification in presence of each other.
Suspect grossly dissimilar from others in lineup.
i. Witness has seen photograph of suspect before lineup.
2. Showup procedure most dangerous-inherently suggestive.
Outline by Ronald Meshbesher distributed at August 1977 Boston meeting of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America College of Advocacy 458-59 (compiled from WALL, supra note 3, at 8-
11) [hereinafter cited as Meshbesher].
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from an array of persons. Second, the police may use a showup proce-
dure where only the suspect is shown to the witness. Finally, the identi-
fication may be made from a picture of the suspect or a group of
pictures, one of which is the suspect. The Supreme Court has been
faced with each of these identification procedures and has enunciated
certain guidelines and tests with regard to each type.
III. THE LAW OF LINEUPS
The Court, in analyzing the lineup procedures used by law en-
forcement, has been faced with two constitutional conflicts: (1) the ap-
plication of the sixth amendment right to counsel in such procedures;
and (2) the application of fourteenth amendment due process consider-
ations. Each of these conflicts represents an area ripe for attack by de-
fense counsel faced with a lineup situation.
A. Right to Counsel at Lineup
The Court, in two cases involving lineups, has defined the parame-
ters of the right to counsel in lineup identifications. In United States v.
Wade,' 1 the Court was faced with a lineup which was held after the
defendant was indicted and counsel had been appointed but not given
notice of the identification proceeding. The defendant, relying on sev-
eral recent Supreme Court cases, 12 argued that the lineup proceeding
was a "critical stage" of the criminal justice process and that counsel
was necessary "to assure a meaningful defense" at trial. 13 The Court,
in this regard, stated:
[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases re-
quires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is
necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial
as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel
at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the par-
ticular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid
that prejudice. 4
11. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
12. See e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
13. 388 U.S. at 220-21.
14. Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 15:38
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Having established the proper test to be applied, the Court then ana-
lyzed and rejected the government's contention that a lineup was
merely a preparatory, investigatory step such as scientific analysis of
fingerprints, blood samples, and other similar tests which are part of
criminal investigations.' 5 The Court found that, unlike the scientific
procedures mentioned, a lineup is subject to innumerable variables and
to possibilities of incurable taint and suggestion.16 However, the Court,
in determining whether the in-court identification should be sup-
pressed, found that if the prosecution could prove an independent ori-
gin for the in-court identification, other than the tainted lineup 17 or one
in which counsel was not present, then it should be admissible.'
While Wade analyzed the admissibility of the testimony of an in-
court identification, it did not address the admissibility of testimony
regarding the identification of the defendant at the lineup. This gap
was closed by the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert v. Calfornia 9
handed down the same day as Wade. The Court in Gilbert extended
the right to counsel and the independent origin test for in-court identifi-
cations found in Wade to state court proceedings. The Court went on
to announce a per se exclusionary rule with regard to testimony con-
cerning a lineup identification where a defendant had been denied his
right to counsel.20 The Court in enunciating this rule stated:
Quite different considerations are involved as to the ad-
mission of the testimony . . that they identified Gilbert at
the lineup. That testimony is the direct result of the illegal
lineup "come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality."
The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show
that that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se
exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective
sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will re-
spect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup. In the absence of legislative reg-
ulations adequate to avoid the hazards to a fair trial which
inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the desirability of
15. Id. at 227-28.
16. See, e.g., note 9 supra and accompanying text.
17. A tainted lineup is one made so inherently suggestive by the actions of law enforcement
officials that it is likely to produce an erroneous identification. It would include the use of persons
who do not resemble the suspect, cross-racial lineups, and other activities which would be likely to
cause such a result.
18. 388 U.S. at 241-42.
19. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
20. Id. at 272-74.
1979]
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deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice must pre-
vail over the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence.2'
Thus, the gap in Wade was closed and a set of constitutional guidelines
for lineups was complete except for two crucial issues: (1) When does
the right to counsel at a lineup proceeding vest; and (2) what is the
scope of that right?
As yet, the Court has only implicitly answered the question of
when the right to counsel at a lineup vests. Both Wade and Gilbert
involved lineups conducted after the defendant was indicted. Thus, it
is clear that, at the latest, the right is vested after indictment. But does
it vest at some earlier point in the criminal process? The Court has not
been faced with such a question in a lineup situation but has answered
it indirectly in a decision concerning showups.z2
As to the second issue, the Court has not yet determined the scope
of the right to counsel, but this issue has been faced by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals. In Richardson v. State,23 a lineup was held
with counsel present, but then the police took the eyewitnesses to an-
other room out of the presence of the accused's counsel to interview
them regarding their identification. At no time during their viewing of
the lineup did they make an identification in the presence of the ac-
cused's counsel. The Oklahoma court, relying upon Wade, held that an
accused's right to counsel under Wade extends to the interview of a
witness following a post-indictment lineup when that interview is con-
ducted for the purpose of identifying an individual who has appeared
in a lineup.' The court went on, however, to find that this illegality
did not taint the witness's in-court identification. The holding in Rich-
ardson clearly reinforces the right to counsel at a lineup identification
and the reasons for such a right.2 5
B. Due Process at Lineups
The Supreme Court has also been faced with determining the ap-
plicability of the fourteenth amendment due process clause to tainted
or suggestive lineup procedures. In the case of Foster v. California26 the
21. Id. at 272-73 (footnote and citation omitted).
22. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
23. 600 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. 1979).
24. d. at 365; People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 92, Cal. Rptr. 6,478 P.2d 942 (1971); State v.
McGhee, 350 So.2d 370 (La. 1977). Both Williams and McGhee were cited with approval by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 600 P.2d at 365 n.1.
25. 600 P.2d at 366.
26. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
[Vol. 15:38
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Court was faced with what it termed "a compelling example of unfair
lineup procedures."' 7 In that case, the defendant, who was approxi-
mately six feet tall, was placed in a lineup shortly after arrest with two
other men who were approximately five feet, five inches tall. The de-
fendant was the only person in the lineup wearing a leather jacket pre-
viously described by the witness. The witness failed to identify posi-
tively the defendant and requested to see the defendant alone. The
police then had the defendant confront the witness alone. Despite this
procedure, the witness was still unsure of his identification. Approxi-
mately one week later, a second lineup was held wherein the defendant
was the only person in the second lineup who had also appeared in the
first lineup. This time the witness positively identified the defendant.
The Court first noted that the conviction was prior to its decisions in
Wade and Gilbert and thus, those decisions were not applicable, as it
had refused to grant retroactivity to them in its decision in Stovall v.
Denno.28 The Court then noted that in Stoval it had stated:
But in declaring the rule of Wade and Gilbert to be applicable
only to lineups conducted after those cases were decided, we
recognized that, judged by the "totality of the circumstances,"
the conduct of identification procedures may be "so unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken iden-
tification" as to be a denial of due process of law. 9
In analyzing the facts surrounding the identification procedure, the
Court concluded that the law enforcement officials involved were re-
peatedly suggesting to the witness that they knew that the defendant
was the culprit. The Court then held that under the test enunciated in
Stovall" the defendant's right to due process had been violated. The
case was reversed and remanded for a determination by the state court
whether such procedure was harmless error.31 In any event, it is clear
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does provide
some protection against tainted or suggestive lineups.
27. Id. at 442.
28. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
29. 394 U.S. at 442.
30. Under Stovall, one must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identifi-
cation procedure. If they are unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identity, the identification has violated due process;And the conviction must be reversed. 388 U.S.
at 302.
31. 394 U.S. at 443-44.
1979]
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IV. THE LAW OF SHOWUPS
The law of showups has progressed along the same lines as the law
of lineups. It does, however, have some significant differences. Owing
to the one-on-one nature of a showup, the real possibility of taint or
suggestion is inherent in the showup procedure. This, at times, has
troubled the Court in its approach to guidelines for showups.32
A. Right to Counsel at Showups
The first major case involving a showup was decided the same day
as Wade and Gilbert. The Court in Stovall v. Denno33 was confronted
with a showup held in the victim's hospital room. The Court, without
significant analysis, applied the analysis of the Wade-Gilbert lineup
cases and held that it would not retroactively apply the exclusionary
rule it had earlier announced34 for identifications made without the
presence of counsel.
After the Stovall decision, the Court was faced with a showup
which the police carried out prior to the indictment or arraignment of
the defendants. In Kirby v. Illinois35 the Court addressed one of the
issues left unanswered in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy: When does
the right to counsel vest? The Court in analyzing the prior cases con-
cerning the right to counsel stated:
/4/l1 of those cases have involved points of time at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment.36
The Court held that where the showup, and by analogy the lineup,
takes place prior to formal initiation of criminal proceedings, there is
no right to counsel and any testimony regarding an identification pro-
ceeding during this time would be admissible.37 Nevertheless, this tes-
timony may not be admissible if the identification procedure violates
due process, and the Court specifically stated in a footnote that the due
process question was left to be decided in federal habeas corpus pro-
32. The Supreme Court in Stovail v. Denno noted: "The practice of showing suspects singly
to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely con-
demned." 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (citation omitted).
33. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
34. Id. at 299-300.
35. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
36. Id. at 689 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 689-690.
[Vol. 15:38
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ceedings. 38 Thus, subject only to the limitations of due process, the
door has been left open to some abuse by law enforcement officials to
proceed prior to arraignment with identification proceedings in the ab-
sence of counsel.
B. Due Process at Showups
In Stovall,39 in addition to the exclusionary rule, the Court was
confronted with a claim that the showup violated the defendant's right
to due process of law. The Court in its analysis stated that the applica-
ble test was whether the identification "was so unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification 40 and that such a
finding "depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding"'"
the identification procedure. In this case the victim was in peril of
death and she was the only person who could exonerate the defendant
by her failure to identify him. Circumstances, therefore, dictated an
immediate showup at the hospital. The Court did, however, recognize
the widespread condemnation of the showup procedure.42
The Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of the applicabil-
38. The Court stated: "In view of our limited grant of certiorari, we do not consider whether
there might have been deprivation of due process in the particularized circumstances of this case.
That question remains open for inquiry in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." Id. at 691 n.8.
39. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
40. Id. at 302.
41. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, reviewing a conviction for possible
violations of due process under this test, outlined ten factors to be considered:
1. Was the defendant the only individual that could possibly be identified as the guilty
party by the complaining witness, or were there others near him at the time of the con-
frontation so as to negate the assertion that he was shown alone to the witness?
2. Where did the confrontation take place?
3. Were there any compelling reasons for a prompt confrontation so as to deprive the
police of the opportunity of securing other similar ifidividuals for the purpose of holding
a lineup?
4. Was the witness aware of any observation by another or other evidence indicating
the guilt of the suspect at the time of the confrontation?
5. Were any tangible objects related to the offense placed before the witness that would
encourage identification?
6. Was the witness' identification based on only part of the suspect's total personality?
7. Was the identification a product of mutual reinforcement of opinion among wit-
nesses simultaneously viewing the suspect?
8. Was the emotional state of the witness such as to preclude objective identification?
9. Were any statements made to the witness prior to the identification indicating to him
that the police were sure of the suspect's guilt?
10. Was the witness's observation of the offender so limited as to render him particu-
larly amendable to suggestion, or was his observation and recollection of the offender so
clear as to insulate him from a tendency to identify on less than a positive basis?
Clemmons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1245 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
42. 388 U.S. at 302.
10
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ity of the due process clause to showups in Neil v. Biggers.4" In Biggers,
the witness had seen the suspect for approximately fifteen minutes in
the moonlight at the time she was raped. Her description of the attack-
er to the police was characterized by the Court as very general: fat and
flabby with smooth skin, bushy hair, and a youthful voice.44 Over the
period of the next seven months, the witness viewed many lineups and
photograph arrays but identified none of the suspects. The police, after
arresting the defendant on another charge, then requested the witness
to view him. The police attempted to arrange a lineup but were unable
to find any person in the jail or juvenile detention center who looked
similar to the defendant. Instead, they proceeded to conduct a showup.
The witness positively identified the defendant.4 5 Because the identifi-
cation took place before the effective date of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall,46
the defendant was forced to rely solely on the due process rationale of
Foster v. California,47 a lineup case, and Simmons v. United States,48 a
case involving photographic identification.49 The Court, in analyzing
the relevant factors of a due process claim, clarified the test by stating:
Some general guidelines emerge from these cases as to
the relationship between suggestiveness and misidentification.
It is first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is
"a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion. . . ." But as Stovall makes clear, the admission of evi-
dence of a showup without more does not violate due process.
We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the
"totality of the circumstances" the identification was reliable
even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.50
Thus, the test for whether due process is violated in a showup con-
frontation is a two-stage test. The triggering stage of the test is proof by
the defendant that some taint or suggestiveness existed at the identifica-
tion proceeding. Once the defendant has met this burden, the Court
43. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
44. Id. at 194.
45. Id. at 194-96.
46. The Court in Stovallheld that the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary per se rule would not apply
to confrontations held prior to June 12, 1967. 388 U.S. at 296.
47. 394 U.S. 440 (1969). See pp. 44-45 supra, for a discussion of the case and due process in
lineup proceedings.
48. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
49. See pp. 49-51 infra, for a discussion of the Simmons case and the law surrounding photo-
graphic identifications and due process considerations.
50. 409 U.S. at 198-99 (citation omitted) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 384).
[Vol. 15:3 8
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will then weigh the factors present in the case to determine whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the identification is unreliable.
The factors which have been ennunciated by the Court are: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal; (2) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (3) the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation.' If, and only if, the
Court is convinced that the identification is unreliable, will it exclude
the testimony under the due process rationale. Therefore, defense
counsel is under a heavy burden in those cases where he must rely
solely on due process to correct problems of improper identification
procedures. Unfortunately, with the loophole in the right to counsel
approach--counsel is not required prior to formal adversary proceed-
ings-this may be the only constitutional attack available in many
identification situations.
V. THE LAW OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION
The law applicable to photographic identifications has developed
in reverse order as compared to that of lineups and showups. The
Supreme Court was faced first with due process considerations and
then right to counsel arguments. It therefore becomes necessary, in or-
der to grasp the Court's approach to the subject properly, to analyze the
cases first from a due process perspective and then from the right to
counsel approach.
A. Due Process in Photographic IdentyFcation
In Simmons v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court was confronted
with a photographic identification and the application of the due proc-
ess rationale in relation to that type of identification procedure. In Sim-
mons, the FBI obtained snapshots of two men suspected of robbing a
savings and loan association. The day after the robbery, five employees
identified the defendant from his snapshot. A week or two later, three
of the five employees also identified the second robber from his snap-
shot. These identification proceedings could be considered photo-
graphic showups as opposed to photographic lineups since only the
suspects' photographs were shown to the witnesses. The defendant did
not contend that under the Wade-Gilbert rationale he had a right to
have counsel present at the photographic identifications, but rather that
51. Id. at 199.
52. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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under the Stovall rationale, the identification procedure was, consider-
ing the totality of surrounding circumstances, conducive to irreparable
misidentification. 3 The Court, applying the Stovall test, determined
that the procedure used to identify the defendant did not exceed the
bounds of due process. It did note the inherent defects and potential
for suggestiveness of photographic identifications, but found that such
identification procedures were widespread among law enforcement
practices and under the facts of this case, essential. It was clear, in this
case, that a serious felony had occurred and that the perpetrators were
still at large. Consequently, swift identification was necessary so that
the FBI could move to apprehend the felons before they fled the vicin-
ity. Further, the physical factors surrounding the crime were such as to
lead to an extremely reliable identification: no masks were worn by the
robbers; they were observed for a period of approximately five minutes;
and the identification was made shortly after the crime.5 4 Although the
photographic showup may have been inherently suggestive, there was
no showing that under the totality of circumstances surrounding the
identification it was unreliable; therefore, due process had not been vio-
lated.
The Supreme Court was recently faced with re-examining the
Stovall two-tier test of due process in photographic identifications
after the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the case of
Manson v. Brathwaite.5  The court of appeals held that the showing of
a single photograph was impermissibly suggestive, and absent exigent
or emergency circumstances, testimony of such identification would be
excluded as violating due process. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reversed the circuit court.5 6 The Court looked to Stovall and
BI.agers and reiterated the two-tier test which was applied in those
cases 5 7 It was also noted in Biggers, prior to applying the two-tier
Stovall test, that the challenged procedure occurred pre-Slovall and
that the question remained open as to what test should be applied to
post-Stoval cases.58 Therefore, Brathwaite presented the Court with
an opportunity to clarify the analysis and test to be applied in post-
Stovall due process challenges to identification procedures, especially
53. Id. at 383.
54. Id. at 384-86.
55. 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
56. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
57. See note 29 supra.
58. 432 U.S. at 107.
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photographic identifications. After reviewing the various pros and cons
of the per se exclusionary rule and the "totality of the circumstances"
test, the Court concluded that the Stovall-Biggers two-tier test applied
to both pre- and post-Stovall identification procedures. Finally, the
Court applied the two-tier test and found that although the one picture
showup was suggestive, the identification was nevertheless reliable and
did not violate due process considerations of fundamental fairness.59
B. Right to Counsel at Photographic Identfcation
Following the Simmons decision, the Supreme Court was still left
with the question of whether the right to counsel applied to photo-
graphic identifications, and if so, at which point in the process the right
to counsel would vest.
In United States v. Ash, 60 a photographic lineup was held approxi-
mately six months after a bank robbery which had lasted three to four
minutes. At that time the four witnesses made uncertain identifications
of the defendant Ash. Later, Ash and a codefendant, Bailey, were in-
dicted for the robbery. Prior to trial, the prosecutor again held a photo-
graphic lineup to determine whether the witnesses would be able to
make in-court identifications. However, only three of the four wit-
nesses were able to identify Ash positively and none of them identified
Bailey. The defendant objected to this last photographic lineup as a
violation of his right to counsel at a "critical stage" of his prosecution,
but recognized that the first photographic lineup did not require coun-
sel because it was not a critical stage under the Kirby rationale.6'
Therefore, the stage was set for the determination of whether the right
to counsel applied to photographic identifications made during a "criti-
cal stage" of the prosecution.
The Court, as in Wade and Gilbert, analyzed the historical roots of
the right to counsel and concluded that the right was to assure effective
assistance at trial, and that this assistance would be something less than
meaningful if limited to formal trials.6 2 The Court, in analyzing past
extensions of the right, stated:
Throughout this expansion of the counsel guarantee to
trial-like confrontations, the function of the lawyer has re-
mained essentially the same as his function at trial. . . to act
59. Id. at 117.
60. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
61. Id. at 303.
62. Id. at 306-13.
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as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the accused. . . In Hamil-
ton and White, for example, the Court envisioned the lawyer
as advising the accused on available defenses in order to al-
low him to plead intelligently. In Massiah counsel could have
advised his client on the benefits of the Fifth Amendment and
could have sheltered him from the overreaching of the prose-
cution. In Coleman the skill of the lawyer in examining wit-
nesses, probing for evidence, and making legal arguments was
relied upon by the Court to demonstrate that, in the light of
the purpose of the preliminary hearing under Alabama law,
the accused required "Assistance" at that hearing.
The function of counsel in rendering "Assistance" con-
tinued at the lineup under consideration in Wade and its
companion cases. Although the accused was not confronted
there with legal questions, the lineup offered opportunities for
prosecuting authorities to take advantage of the accused.
Counsel was seen by the Court as being more sensitive to, and
aware of, suggestive influences than the accused himself, and
as better able to reconstruct the events at trial. Counsel pres-
ent at lineup would be able to remove disabilities of the ac-
cused in precisely the same fashion that counsel compensated
for the disabilities of the layman at trial.63
The Supreme Court then noted that the court of appeals approach
of focusing on the potential for misidentification and the lack of scien-
tific precision in photographic identifications was not the proper test for
determining whether the right to counsel applied,64 but was a misappli-
cation of the due process test. The Court stated that the threshold
question is whether the procedure employed is one of confrontation;
and that photographic identification is not of a confrontation nature
but would become so if counsel for the defense were interjected into the
process. Further, the Court decided that such an expansion of the right
to counsel would intrude upon a portion of the prosecutor's prepara-
tion interviews with witnesses, and was vehemently opposed to such a
result.65 It concluded that the adversary process was sufficient to ex-
pose any possible defects in photographic identification procedures.
The case was reversed and remanded to allow further findings concern-
ing the potential due process issues.66
63. Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 314.
65. Id. at 317-18.
66. Id. at 312.
[Vol. 15:3 8
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The result of these cases involving photographic identifications is
that no right to counsel exists at any stage of the proceeding-another
potential loophole for law enforcement abuse. Defense counsel is left,
therefore, with only due process considerations to attack such identifi-
cation procedures.
VI. A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
For the most part, the courts have been faced with determining
what rights a defendant has in relation to an identification proceeding
compelled by the state.67 A concomitant issue of recent development,
however, is the extent to which a defendant can claim a constitutional
right to compel the state to hold identification proceedings when the
state decides not to do so. 68 The law is exceedingly unclear; but when
measured against the policies underlying the Supreme Court decisions
in the previously discussed identification cases, 69 it appears that such a
right should exist. This conclusion is bolstered by the Court's decision
in the area of criminal discovery7" and the American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Standards Relating to Discovery.7
The California Supreme Court, in Evans v. Superior Court,72 was
confronted with a writ of mandamus filed on behalf of a defendant who
had filed a motion with the trial court prior to trial requesting a lineup
in his robbery prosecution. An order by the appellate court had been
issued to the trial court directing it to vacate its denial of the lineup or,
in the alternative, to show cause why the order denying a lineup should
67. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Foster v. Cali-
fornia, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
68. See United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683, 699 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974); United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1-203 (2d. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970); Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681 (1974); State v.
Boettcher, 388 So.2d 1356 (La. 1976); State v. Walls, 138 N.J. Super. 445, 351 A.2d 379 (1976).
69. It appears that the policies running throughout the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
identification cases are twofold: (1) To guard against an erroneous conviction by attempting to
prevent identification procedures which are so suggestive as to lead to a misidentification; and, (2)
to provide for counsel in those proceedings in which his presence will aid in the accused's defense
at trial.
70. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
71. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RELATING To DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURES BEFORE TRIAL §§ 1.1, 1.2, (Approved
Draft 1969). As set forth therein, liberal discovery should be allowed because it facilitates the
accused's decision regarding a plea of guilty; insures that such a plea is intelligently made; and, if
trial is required, insures that it is competently prepared and not delayed because of surprise.
72. 11 Cal. 3d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681 (1974).
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not be vacated. The trial court then found that although fairness de-
manded that a lineup be held, it did not have the discretion to order
such a proceeding. The appellate court found that the trial court did
have the discretion to direct such a proceeding and remanded the case
for a determination of whether such a proceeding should be granted
under the guidelines set out in the opinion.73
In its analysis, the appellate court made clear that this was not a
question of whether an in-court identification was admissible, but,
whether fairness to an accused in the pre-trial discovery process de-
manded such a proceeding. 74 It noted that the search for truth at trial
would be furthered by such discovery, and that if the state could re-
quire a defendant to submit to such a process, then the defendant
should be afforded the same opportunity.75 Moreover, the court then
found that due process requires the state to conduct identification pro-
ceedings in those cases where, (1) contingent upon a timely request by
the defendant, (2) eyewitness identification is a material issue, and (3)
there is a reasonable likelihood of misidentification, (4) which would be
resolved by a lineup.76 A trial court is therefore confronted, in every
case where a defendant requests pre-trial identification procedures,
with an ad hoc balancing of the costs of such procedures against the
likelihood that they will clarify the identification in the case or rectify a
misidentification in the case. It should be noted that the test adopted
by the California Supreme Court in this regard is quite similar to the
test of due process set forth in Stoval 7 and Biggers78 in that it focuses
on the potential of misidentification and reliability of the identification
procedures employed. Due process considerations of a fair trial and
right to counsel policies of effective and meaningful assistance of coun-
73. 522 P.2d at 686-87. The court therein states:
[In an appropriate case. . . an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pre-
trial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. The right
to a lineup arises, however, only when eyewitness identification is shown to be in mate-
rial issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a
lineup would tend to resolve.
• . . Such motion should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as
practicable. We note that motions which are not made until shortly before trial should,
unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such
delay.
Id.
74. Id. at 684.
75. Id. at 684-85.
76. Id. at 686.
77. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
78. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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sel at trial are therefore advanced by the finding of a qualified right to
identification proceedings by the defendant.
In their views of the defendant's right to identification procedures,
the federal courts are divided. Some courts hold that the defendant
does not have a right to compel the government to provide him a
lineup;7 9 others find that in appropriate circumstances a trial court,
upon request by the defendant, may order identification procedures, 80
or that such an order is within its inherent discretion and would not be
reversible' error if granted.8' Several state courts, at this time, have
found at least a discretionary right to a lineup based upon the Supreme
Court's decisions in Williams v. Florida8 2 and Wardius v. Oregon83 that
there is a reciprocal-fairness doctrine 84 at work, and have held that
where the state can compel a lineup, fairness would dictate that the
defendant be given the same right.8 5
It has also been mentioned that the Brady v. Maryland86 holding,
requiring the prosecution to disclose to the defense exculpatory evi-
dence, would require a lineup based upon a demand by the defense
and knowledge by the state that such a proceeding might prove excul-
patory.87 Therefore, it should be observed by defense counsel that a
qualified right to compel identification procedures has four foundation
points. It furthers the policies underlying the expansion of due process
and the right to counsel in identification proceedings of Wade-Gilbert-
Stovail. It promotes the truth seeking process of trial. It falls within
the enunciated reciprocal fairness doctrine of Williams and Wardius. It
falls within the disclosure of exculpatory evidence holding of Brady.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Poe, 462 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 845
(1973); United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Savich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1970), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 834
(1970).
82. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
83. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
84. The reciprocal-fairness doctrine as stated in Wardius v. Ore., 412 U.S. 470 (1973), merely
holds that where the state has the duty to allow discovery of evidence then the defendant should
have a similar duty subject to constitutional limitations. It has also been stated that discovery
must be a two-way street in order to be fair to all parties concerned. Therefore, if the state has the
power to compel a lineup in certain situations, it would only be fair to allow the accused the same
right.
85. See, e.g., Evans v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681 (1974);
State v. Boettcher, 338 So.2d 1356 (La. 1976); State v. Walls, 138 N.J. Super. CL 445, 351 A.2d 379
(1976).
86. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
87. Evans v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 617, 621, 114 Cal. Rptr. 124, _, 522 P.2d 681, 684 (1974).
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Counsel should not discard the possibility that a timely motion"8 for
88. The author has adopted the following form from one used by the Public Defenders Office
of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and has used it with some success in that jurisdiction.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF
STATE OF_




MOTION TO COMPEL LINEUP
COMES NOW the defendant by his/her attorney of record, , and moves
this Court to compel the State to conduct a lineup prior to preliminary hearing with the defendant
in participation wherein any potential identification witness would be requested to make, if possi-
ble, a positive identification of the person alleged to have committed the offense. The defendant
makes this motion on the following grounds:
(1) The preliminary hearing for the defendant is set for hearing on the - day of. ,
19-;
(2) Defendant alleges that at said preliminary hearing he/she would be required to be pres-
ent at the counsel table. Only counsel for the State and Defendant will be in his/her immedi-
ate vicinity. From this situation, any complaining witness is made obviously aware of who
the defendant is.
(3) The prior opportunity of the complaining witness to observe the allege criminal act and
its alleged perpetrator was extremely limited.
(4) There have been no lineups or showups to the defendant's knowledge prior to this time
where the complaining witness had an opportunity to observe the subject accused of the
crime. Given the placement of the defendant in the preliminary hearing, there arises for the
complaining witness an inescapable assumption that the defendant is the perpetrator of the
offense.
(5) The placement of the defendant at preliminary hearing amounts to a one-man showup,
wherein the complaining witness is confronted by only the defendant.
(6) The practice of showing the suspect singly to persons for the purposes of identification,
and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned. Stovall v. Derno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
(7) The placement of the defendant at the preliminary hearing is so impermissibly sugges-
tive that the defendant will be denied due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7, of the Oklahoma
Constitution. U.S. v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Court to order the State to conduct a lineup with
the Defendant appearing, for all potential identification witnesses prior to preliminary hearing in
this case. Further, the defendant requests a continuance of the preliminary hearing until such
time as the lineup can be held.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Such a motion may very well result in a lineup for the defendant but as has been stated in Evans
v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681 (1974), it must be timely made.
Counsel should also be aware of the line of cases which hold that in-court identification is not
inadmissible on the grounds that no pre-trial identification proceeding was held. Those cases have
language that seems to indicate that an accused cannot compel a lineup prior to an in-court identi-
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identification proceedings in appropriate cases may well be a viable
part of the defense strategy.
VII. METHODS OF ATTACKING IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Defense counsel, when faced with either an in-court identification
or testimony concerning a prior extra-judicial identification, should be
cognizant of the various factors which compound the probability of
misidentification 9 and the danger signals of probable misidentifica-
tion.9° With a firm understanding of these factors, counsel is in a better
position to attack the testimony of the witness both at trial and on ap-
peal. First, by recognizing the factors which increase the likelihood of
misidentification and the danger signals of a misidentification, counsel
can better consider the possibility of successfully raising any constitu-
tional objections based upon the law as previously discussed. If there is
a likelihood that a constitutional violation has occurred, counsel should
timely file his objections and preserve the objections for possible appel-
fication. It would seem, however, that these cases only go to the admissibility of an in-court
identification and not the accused's right to compel pre-trial identification proceedings. See, e.g.,
Fortune v. State, 549 P.2d 380 (Okla. Crim. 1976); Grigsby v. State, 496 P.2d 1188 (Okla. Crim.
1972); Roberson v. State, 483 P.2d 353 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
89. One commentator has catalogued various factors that highlight and compound the prob-
lem of erroneous identification:
A. Suspect may be erroneously identified by a number of witnesses.
B. Relatives and close friends have erroneously identified persons.
C. Trained observers may be in error-policemen, etc.
D. The most positive identification may be wrong.
E. Witnesses' fear is difficult to assess.
F. Erroneous identification [has occurred] in even capital cases.
G. Juries are often unduly receptive to evidence of identification.
H. Erroneously identified person often does not resemble [the] actual guilty party.
Meshbesher, supra, note 10, at 459 (compiled from WALL, supra note 2, at 11-25).
90. There are various danger signals which counsel should be aware of and which one author
has listed as:
A. The witness originally stated that he would be unable to identify anyone.
B. Witness knew defendant before [the] crime but made no accusation when first ques-
tioned.
C. Serious discrepancy between original description of culprit and actual description of
defendant [identified at lineup].
D. Witness first identified another.
E. Other witnesses failed to identify defendant.
F. Prior to trial, witness sees defendant but fails to identify him.
G. Limited opportunity to observe criminal.
H. Witness and defendant are of different racial groups.
I. Considerable time lapse between the crime and identification.
J. Crime was committed by a number of persons.
K. Witness fails to make positive trial identification.
L. Original observation of perpetrator (was) made when witness was unaware that a
crime was being committed.
M. Witnesses confuse activities of multiple defendants at scene of crime.
Meshbesher, supra note 10, at 460 (compiled from WALL, supra note 3, 90-130).
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late review. Second, once possible constitutional objections have been
thoroughly considered, counsel should consider the various possible
pre-trial, trial, and appellate strategies available to attack either testi-
mony of an in-court identification or of an extra-judicial identification.
This analysis must begin the moment counsel enters the case, because
much can be done early in the defense which may prevent later difficul-
ties.
A. Initiating the Right to Counsel
A starting point for analysis would be the interrelationship of the
constitutional rules set out in the case law with the pre-trial procedure
of the jurisdiction. In particular, the rule of Kirby9' as to when the
right to counsel attaches has great significance when considered with
the timing of a preliminary arraignment for the accused. If counsel
were able to compel initiation of formal criminal proceedings, the right
to counsel would vest, and he would have the right to be present to
observe and possibly control any actions taken after that. Several deci-
sions of the Supreme Court may give counsel some control over the
initiation of proceedings and thus make counsel's presence at any iden-
tification proceeding mandatory.
Under the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona,92 the defendant
has a right to call counsel to be present at any custodial interrogation.93
It would seem, then, that counsel will be called into a case, in many
instances, very early. Counsel's duty at that point should be to manip-
ulate the system so that formal proceedings are initiated, thus triggering
the right to counsel.
Counsel may have two options available to force formal proceed-
ings. In many states, either by legislation or judicial construction, the
defendant has a right to a prompt preliminary arraignment 94 similar to
the guidelines established in the federal system under the McNabb-
Mallory95 rule. Although this rule was established prior to Miranda to
91. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
93. For a comprehensive treatment of what constitutes custody for the triggering of Miranda
rights see 31 A.L.R.3d 565.
94. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 181 (1971); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 764.13 (1968). A
complete list of statutes may be found in ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE
app. VI (rent. Draft No. 1 1966).
95. In two cases the Supreme Court, by its supervisory powers over federal courts, held that a
confession would be invalid and inadmissible if obtained during a delay in taking the defendant
before a magistrate for arraignment. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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guard against coerced confessions, it would appear that its policies of
swiftly attaching the right to counsel so as to protect against abuses of
the defendant's rights would be served by applying it in cases where
identification proceedings will be necessary.96 If, however, prompt ar-
raignment is not available to defense counsel, there is at least one other
alternative in limited circumstances. In the case of Gerstein v. Pugh ,97
the Supreme Court held that where a defendant was arrested without a
warrant and not shortly released on bail, he or she was entitled to a
prompt non-adversary hearing on whether there was probable cause
for the arrest.98 This issue and its relationship to identification proce-
dures does not appear to have been addressed by any court, but it
would seem that such a hearing would be the "initiation of formal
criminal proceedings," 99 and that from that point forward, the right to
counsel would have attached.
There is, however, one limitation to both the prompt arraignment
and probable cause hearing analysis. Both are contingent upon counsel
being called shortly after the defendant's arrest under the Miranda
guidelines. If the police decide to postpone custodial interrogation un-
til after an identification proceeding, the right to counsel will not have
attached and the accused will not have had the opportunity to contact
counsel. Defense counsel would not be notified of the identification
proceeding, but even if he were notified, the accused would have no
right to have his lawyer present."
B. Pre-trial Identfcation Strategies
Assuming that counsel is successful in forcing the formal initiation
of criminal proceedings and thus attaching the right to counsel at sub-
sequent identification proceedings, the question then arises as to what
counsel can do to protect his client at the identification.' 0' Most often
96. See generally Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash; Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against The Danger of Convicting he Innocent, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 786 (1974).
97. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
98. Id. at 126.
99. 460 U.S. at 689.
100. As the Court in Miranda noted: "If authorities conclude that they will not provide coun-
sel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may
refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do
not question him during that time." 384 U.S. at 474.
101. The staff of the Center for Responsive Psychology has, from its research in the area of
eyewitness identification, developed a checklist for counsel to tally points of suggestiveness at a
lineup proceeding. The following questions are to be answered by counsel, all yes responses
should be totaled and the higher the total the more unreliable the lineup proceeding.
1. Was the witness shown any photographs of the suspect prior to the lineup?
1979]
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he will be faced with a formal lineup and the following suggestions are
focused on that procedure, although they may be modified for any
identification confrontation. 102
First, counsel should request the presence of a court reporter or
hire a certified reporter to be present with him at the proceeding. 103
The reporter has several tasks: (1) to report all statements made before,
during and after the proceeding; (2) to report for counsel his dictated
descriptions of all those participating in the lineup as well as any fac-
tors counsel may observe to be suggestive; and (3) to preserve for the
record any objections counsel might have to the procedures of the iden-
tification. This record, although at this early point not part of the trial
record, may be invaluable at a later suppression hearing and possibly
may be introduced in evidence at that time. I°4 Even if such a record is
2. Have the witnesses been shown prior lineups related in this case?
3. Are there less than six people in the lineup?
4. Are any of the participants in the lineup from a different race and/or ethnic back-
ground?
5. Do the participants have different skin tones?
6. Do the participants have different amounts and styles of facial hair?
7. Are the participants widely varied in age?
8. Do the participants differ in height?
9. Do the participants have different body frames or stature (weight included)?
10. Are the participants different in modes of dress?
11. Do the participants have different styles of hair (example: braided, afro, DA, par-
tial balding)?
12. Do any of the participants in the lineup differ from the original description given by
the witness?
13. Did the officer in charge make the witness aware that a suspect is present in the
lineup?
14. If a suspect is present in the lineup, does the officer in charge know his position
within the lineup?
15. Is there more than one witness present at the lineup?
16. If there is more than one witness, did they have an opportunity to discuss the events
of the case?
17. If a positive identification is made, does the witness give a verbal response instead
of writing down the choice on a form?
18. Does the form lack a zero choice (a number representing a non-identification)?
19. Is there anyone else in the lineup other than the one suspect who could be a suspect
in this or related crimes?
20. Was the witness told in any way that he or she was 'correct' in making an identifica-
tion?
21. Did the officer conducting the lineup suggest or emphasize any one individual
through word, gesture, tone or number?
Staff Project, Center for Responsive Psychology, How Fair is Your Lineup?, 2 Soc. ACT. & THE
LAW 9 (1975).
102. See, e.g., I CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 2.16(2) (S. Bernstein ed. 1969).
103. See, ag., Meshbesher, supra note 9, at 465.
104. If the lineup was tainted and a suppression hearing is held, it may be possible to call the
reporter and have him or her use the transcript of the event to refresh their memory. If due to the
press of work upon the reporter they do not remember all of the events, the transcript could then
be introduced into evidence. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 9, at 14 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
23
Salisbury: Eyewitness Identifications: A New Perspective on Old Law
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFIC TION
inadmissible, it may prove useful at trial to cross-examine the eyewit-
nesses and the law enforcement authorities about the identification.
Second, counsel should request the names and addresses of all wit-
nesses who attend the lineup proceeding.10 5 This would allow the de-
fense to start immediately to investigate the witnesses for possible
points of impeachment with regard to their ability to observe, perceive,
and recollect the incident in question. Third, counsel should request
copies of any descriptions given to the authorities by the witnesses prior
to the identification proceeding.10 6 This may provide counsel with in-
consistencies between the written descriptions and the identification
and thus prove useful for impeachment. Fourth, counsel should re-
quest that the lineup be photographed so as to preserve a record of any
variations in physical appearance between the lineup subjects.107 Fifth,
counsel should consider requesting either a "blank" lineup to test
whether the witnesses are guessing, or that the lineup consist of as
many persons as possible. For example, a twelve-man lineup would
increase the probabilities against a random choice or guess.10 8 Sixth,
counsel should request time to confer with his client to advise him that
he has no right to refuse to participate in the lineup10 9 and that he may
be compelled to say certain words or wear certain clothes." 0 Finally,
counsel should make certain prior to the lineup that if certain clothing
is to be worn before the witnesses, it fits all participants in the lineup."'
By taking these steps, counsel can avoid a tainted lineup or at least
preserve the tainted points for later objection at a suppression hearing.
These actions also enable counsel to fulfill the policies underlying the
right to counsel by equipping him to protect effectively the defendant's
rights and assist him at trial.
105. See, e.g., I CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 2.16(2) (S. Bernstein ed. 1969) (citing with
approval, United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 438 P.2d 287, 289 (Okla.Crim. 1968).
108. See, e.g., Meshbesher, supra note 9, at 464.
109. This is important because the accused's demeanor when compared to others in the lineup,
may be a crucial factor in causing a witness to focus on him. If the accused is aware that he must
cooperate with the police in this proceeding, he will be less likely to give himself away to a witness
by uncooperative behavior.
110. See, e.g., I CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 2.16(2) (S. Bernstein ed. 1969).
111. It would seem that the pinnacle of suggestiveness would be a lineup wherein the partici-
pants are directed to wear a particular coat and that coat fit only the defendant. However, counsel
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C. Jury Selection and Identfcation Strategies
Assuming counsel has properly and adequately prepared prior to
trial, there are many stages during the trial which offer means of attack-
ing identification testimony. Counsel should be aware of the possibili-
ties of voir dire and the opening statement as a means of conditioning
-the jury for the potential identification testimony which will be intro-
duced later. Within legal and ethical limits, counsel should attempt to
"teach" the jury: (1) the fallibility of eyewitness identifications; (2) the
factors which confound the identification process; and (3) the danger
signals of potential misidentification. 112 The psychological research in
the area of eyewitness identification" 3 combined with a scientific ap-
proach to jury selection" 4 may provide counsel with a jury receptive to
the possibility that an eyewitness may be fallible and has made an erro-
neous identification.
D. Evidence and Identfcation Strategies
Although somewhat outlandish at first thought, a possible ap-
proach for counsel would be to attack admissibility of an eyewitness
identification from the standpoint of relevancy. Professor McCormick,
in analyzing the test for relevance, concluded that it is twofold: Does
the evidence tend to prove or establish a material issue in the case; does
its probative value outweigh its prejudicial costs. 115 It may be argued
112. See notes 74, 75 supra and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Idenifilcation, 2 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 75
(1976); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171 (1975); Buckhout, Alper, Chem,
Silverberg & Slomovits, Determinants of Eyewitness Peformance On a Lineup, 4 BULL. PSYCHO-
NOMIC SOC. 191 (1974); Feingold, The Influence of Environment On Ideniication of Persons and
Things, 5 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 39 (1914); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identca.
tion: The Gapfrom Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973); Loftus, Unconscious Transfer-
ence in Eyewitness Identfcation, 2 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 93 (1976); Loftus, Reconstructing Memory.
The Incredible Eyewitness, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 188 (1975); Loftus, Altman & Geballe, Ejfects of
Questioning Upon A Witness'Later Recollections, 3 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 162 (1975); Loftus &
Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony The Influence of the Wording of a Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC
Soc. 86 (1975); Luce, Blacks, Whites and Yellows: They All Look Alike To Me, PSYCH. TODAY,
Nov. 1974, at 105; Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition For Faces of Own & Other Races, 13 J. PERS. &
Soc. PSYCH. 330 (1969); Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of Question And Atmo-
sphere of Interrogation On Accuracy And Completeness Of Testimony, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1620
(1971).
114. See, e.g., A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: NEW TECHNIQUES AND
CONCEPTS (1977); Forum, Forensic Sociology and Psychology: New Toolsfor the Criminal Defense
Attorney, 12 TULSA L.J. 274 (1976); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECH-
NIQUES (1979); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING
PREJUDICE (1975).
115. McCoRMICK, supra note 103, § 185, at 434-41.
[Vol. 15:3 8
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that under certain circumstances, eyewitness testimony of identification
fails to meet either part of the test.
In considering the first tier of the test, counsel should focus on the
level of error in eyewitness identifications. As has previously been dis-
cussed,1 16 eyewitness identifications both in this country and abroad
have been shown to be subject to erroneous results. However, high
levels of error would not, without more, justify exclusion of eyewitness
testimony. 17 No system of justice could survive if it required total ac-
curacy from the evidence presented to its courts. Consider, however,
the effect upon such testimony's tendency to prove a material issue, if it
were proven to have a considerable level of error. For example, one
statistical survey 18 tested the effect of a bystander's picture being in-
cluded in a photographic lineup. In a photographic array without the
bystander's picture, eighty-four percent of those tested were able to cor-
rectly identify the perpetrator with an error of twelve percent and a
four percent refusal to make an identification. When the bystander's
picture was added to the array, sixty percent of those tested chose the
bystander, sixteen percent were incorrect and twenty-four percent re-
fused to make a choice.' 19 It can be concluded from such results that,
in many instances, eyewitness testimony concerning identification does
not tend to prove a material fact, and therefore, fails the first tier of the
relevancy test. By having a knowledge of those factors which tend to
reduce the reliability of eyewitness testimony, counsel may be able to
raise a valid objection to the relevancy of such evidence.
Even if there is still a slight tendency for the evidence to prove a
material issue, it may still be rationally argued that the evidence's pro-
bative value is outweighed by its prejudicial costs. Error laden evi-
dence is, without doubt, highly prejudicial and has little probative
value. The courts would therefore be faced with the task under the
traditional rules of evidence of justifying the admission of evidence
which is arguably inadmissible. 0
116. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
117. With the notable exception of the polygraph, which has been shown to have an error
factor of less than one percent and yet is inadmissible, the courts of this country are forced to
accept evidence which is less than one hundred percent reliable. See, J. REID & F. INBAu, TRUTH
AND DECEPTION 234 (1966).
118. Loftus, Unconscious Transference in Eyewitness Ident~fcation, 2 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 93
(1976).
119. Id. at96.
120. From exhaustive research, it appears that this objection has either not been raised or else
not been dealt with by the appellate courts. Counsel has little likelihood of getting such an objec-
tion sustained. By raising it, however, and making an offer of proof of psychological data which
1979]
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E. Cross-examination and Identofcation Strategies
Cross-examination offers defense counsel an opportunity to attack
directly the identification of his client and he must be prepared to do so
vigorously. One method of mounting such an attack is to question the
witness as to factors which may have tainted the identification proce-
dure based upon counsel's knowledge of the causes of erroneous identi-
fications,' 21 the factors which compound or highlight erroneous
identifications, 22 the danger signals of misidentification, 23 the factors
which some courts have recognized as leading to misidentification, 24
and the factors used as a checklist of suggestiveness at identification
proceedings.'25 If these various factors have been properly outlined to
the jury in the opening statement, the jury should be able to compre-
hend counsel's line of attack and therefore be cognizant of the potential
errors in the witness's testimony. Because of the damaging nature of
eyewitness identification testimony, 26 counsel should prepare thor-
oughly for cross-examination of an identifying witness and should
leave no stone unturned in his attempts to impeach the witness. Only
through searching cross-examination can counsel hope to attack di-
rectly the identification of his client made by an eyewitness.
F. The Expert Witness and Ident/cation Strategies
A new possibility for attacking eyewitness identification testimony
has emerged recently in the form of expert testimony on the psychol-
ogy 27 of perception, memory, and identification. 28  Several federal
courts have faced the issue 29 and have rejected the expert's testimony
on the basis that identification is an issue which is of common knowl-
would show the high percentage of error, counsel may achieve two advantages: (I) the trial judge
may be more receptive to defense oriented instructions on the issue of eyewitness identification
testimony; and (2) the offer of proof in the record may affect the appellate court's ruling on a claim
of a violation of due process.
121. See note 9 supra.
122. See note 74 supra.
123. See note 75 supra.
124. See note 29 supra.
125. See note 85 supra.
126. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
127. For an exhaustive treatment and bibliography of the area, the reader is directed to
A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
128. The possibilities of expert testimony in this area are almost endless and counsel should
make himself aware of them. The reader is directed to a new publication entitled, SOCIAL ACTION
& THE LAW, which is published by the Center for Responsive Psychology, Brooklyn College, for a
continuing source of new psychological data relevant to the practice of law.
129. See, eg., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Amaral,
[Vol. 15:38
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edge to the jury, and an expert is therefore unnecessary. Nevertheless,
this conclusion is erroneous in light of the recent developments of psy-
chology in the fields of perception, memory and identification. 30  It
can hardly be argued that the average layman has knowledge of and
understands the psychological theories of how one perceives events oc-
curring around him, the factors which affect such perception, the means
by which the human brain retains and recalls such perception, and re-
cent psychological findings in the field of eyewitness identification.1 31
Thus, excluding expert testimony on the basis that the testimony is
common knowledge to the jury is not a valid ruling. 132 Counsel should
realize, however, that the exclusion of his expert at trial is, without
more, probably not worth the trouble of appellate review because the
standard to be applied upon appeal is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding the evidence.133 Under such a standard there is
little likelihood of reversing a conviction solely upon the exclusion of
expert testimony concerning identification. Despite the rejection of
such testimony by the appellate courts, 134 counsel should be aware that
a growing number of trial courts are allowing such testimony. 135 The
old maxim, "nothing ventured, nothing gained," is applicable here.
Counsel would be well advised to consider calling an expert witness to
testify upon the issues of eyewitness identification and its psychological
defects.
488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord, People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr., 69
(1975); Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 287 N.E.2d 599 (1972).
130. See note 96 supra.
131. It would appear from the rulings of the various courts in this area that counsel, in order
to gain the right to call an expert witness, must overwhelm the trial judge with a vast amount of
psychological data on the particular scientific point for which he wishes to call the expert. Unless
the judge is convinced that this area is beyond the realm of common knowledge for the average
layman, there is very little likelihood that it will be allowed into evidence.
132. It takes very little review of the new psychological research in the fields of perception,
memory, retention, and recall, as well as the specific research on eye-witness identification, to
realize that such is beyond the common knowledge ofthe averagejuror. What must be impressed
upon the judge is that, although we all see things every day, very few of us perceive them and are
able to retain and recall them. For instance, you probably saw the person sitting in front of you
during your last bus or airplane ride, however, probably very few of us remember what that
person looked like or what they were wearing. The expert witness would be able to explain the
scientific basis of perceptive processes and explain what factors were working for and against the
eyewitness and his perception of the perpetrator of the crime.
133. See note 111 supra.
134. Id.
135. Professor Buckhout, one of the leading authorities in this field, has listed approximately
twenty trials in which he has been allowed to testify concerning the psychology of eye-witness
identification. See, Buckhout 3 Soc. Act. & THE LAW 51-52 (1976).
1979]
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G. Jury Instructions and Identification Strategies
Another procedure during the criminal trial which has often been
ignored or taken lightly by defense counsel but offers another mode of
attacking eyewitness testimony of identification is jury instruction. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of United
States v. Tefaire'36 recommended model special instructions1 37 dealing
136. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
137. The text of the model special instructions is as follows:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of providing identity,
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt
as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may
convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its
value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of
the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of the witness, you should consider the
following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportu-
nity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the
time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a time was
available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whether
the witness had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception through
the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of sight-but
this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses*].
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the
offense was the product of his own recolleiction? You may take into account both the
strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was
made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances
under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize
the identification with great care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed
between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see de-
fendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defend-
ant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results
from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness*].
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to make
an identification of defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his
identification at trial*].(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the
same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he
had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in
his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every ele-
ment of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which
he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to
the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty. *Sentences in
brackets to be used only if appropriate.
469 F.2d 552, 558 app. (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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with identification testimony. These instructions are an excellent ex-
ample of what defense counsel should consider in requesting instruc-
tions in a criminal case involving identification evidence.
In the first instance, the instructions state clearly the burden of
proof carried by the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. This is
crucial because the other techniques of attacking identification testi-
mony are of little value if the jury does not clearly understand that the
identity issue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state.
Techniques for attacking identification testimony are aimed toward
raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors and they must
therefore clearly understand the burden of proof. The model instruc-
tions then explain several factors which may cause misidentification
and ask the jury to examine the evidence to determine whether any of
these factors exist. The instructions end by reiterating the burden of
proof on establishing the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime.
Counsel, when drafting instructions in an eyewitness identification
case, should consider which points of taint or suggestion have been
proven and which factors tending to cause misidentification have been
proven by the evidence and draft into his proposed instruction specific
means by which the jury may deal with this evidence. 138 In this man-
ner, if the state's procedure permits, the jury will have with them in the
jury room a checklist of misidentification factors when they are deliber-
ating. There can be little doubt as to the value such an instruction can
be to the defense.
H. Criminal Appeals and Identilcation Strategies
One final area which defense counsel should not overlook when
faced with eyewitness testimony is the possibility of establishing special
state procedures or state constitutional standards as a point of appeal.
Since the advent of the Burger Court and the passing of the Warren
era, the Supreme Court decisions in the area of criminal defendants
and their rights have been few and, for the most part, restrictive in their
analysis of prior decisions. One commentator has noted this trend and
138. As should be noted, the model in Telfaire does not cover all possible points of taint or
misidentification and therefore counsel should take extreme care in inserting proper language to
cover any such points that may have been brought out at trial. This type of careful drafting will
insure that these crucial issues will be before the jury and may be the subject ofjury deliberations.
19791
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has suggested that state constitutions may provide a barrier to such in-
roads.' 39 This attitude can be seen in Pennsylvania's rejection of the
narrow approach taken by the Supreme Court to the right to counsel in
identification procedures. The Pennsylvania court held that under its
constitution, a much broader right to counsel exists.' 41 Similarly,
Oklahoma has adopted specific guidelines on the procedure to be used
in conducting a lineup.'4 ' Such independent state grounds should be
urged on appeal in order to build a strong state basis against the en-
croachment upon individual rights on the federal level.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law in regard to identification procedures, both from a right to
counsel perspective and a due process approach, appears at this time to
be firmly established and leaves room for abuse from overzealous law
enforcement tactics. The right to counsel in an identification procedure
exists only if the accused has been formally charged and the criminal
proceedings have been formally initiated. Law enforcement officials
are thereby given great leeway in their actions prior to the filing of an
information or the return of a grand jury indictment. An accused's
fourteenth amendment right to due process provides only that under
the totality of the circumstances, if the procedures are conducive to an
unnecessarily suggestive identification, the courts may suppress the
identification. The challenge for the defense counsel, who might not be
allowed to be present, is how the totality of the circumstances can be
proved, except by the testimony of the very law enforcement officers
whose procedure he is attacking.
In order to combat excessive zeal on the part of law enforcement
officials and to protect the rights of his client, defense counsel must
assume an active role throughout the criminal justice process. The ad-
vent of new and verified psychological research data may provide a
multitude of approaches to attack the damaging evidence of eyewitness
identification. Because of the duty of zealous advocacy, 142 defense
counsel bears the burden of both researching and understanding this
139. Comment, Protecting FundamentalRights in State Courts: FitingA4 State Peg toAd Federal
Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1977).
140. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974). See, Note, Common-
wealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of Procedural Rights Beyond Supreme Court Require-
ments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 577 (1975).
141. Thompson v. State, 438 P.2d 287 (Okla. Crim. 1968).
142. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7.
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psychological data and applying it in those cases where it is appropri-
ate. Further, by undertaking such a duty, defense counsel may well
protect the innocent from the misidentification which, although not fre-
quent, does occur in the criminal justice system. Defense counsel may
thereby further the search for truth in a professional and meaningful
manner.
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